An Alabama justice asks whether “relative hardship” is really a defense at all
An Alabama justice asks whether “relative hardship” is really a defense at all
2026-09-10 · Alabama · Courts
The doctrine that decides most Alabama covenant fights may be sitting on the wrong side of the courtroom, and a member of the Supreme Court of Alabama has now said so out loud.
On December 19, 2025 the court decided Dendy v. Ryan, No. SC-2025-0024, affirming a Marshall Circuit Court injunction in favour of the Architectural Committee of the River Pointe Subdivision near Guntersville.1 Chief Justice Stewart and Justices Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, Cook and McCool concurred; Justice Sellers concurred in the result. Justice Parker concurred specially, and his separate writing is the part practitioners will remember.
What the court decided
Michael Dendy and Dendy Investment Group built on Lots 7 and 8 without a permit, departed from the plans the architectural committee had approved, and violated Guntersville building codes. The trial court ordered them to obtain approval or remove the unapproved structures.
On appeal the Dendy defendants argued the trial court should have applied the relative-hardship test — the equitable doctrine under which a court may refuse to enforce a restrictive covenant by injunction where the harm to the burdened owner “would be considerably disproportionate to the benefit received by the landowner seeking enforcement.”
The court agreed they had preserved it. Because they raised the defense before trial without objection, “the issues to be tried were expanded to include the applicability of the relative-hardship test.” But preserving a defense is not the same as being allowed to use it.
The trial court had declined to apply the test on clean-hands grounds, and the Supreme Court held that was within its discretion. The evidence supporting that conclusion came from Dendy himself: he testified, as the trial court's judgment recorded, that his position was that he could obtain the committee's approval for one construction plan and instead build something entirely different. That, the court said, “supports a conclusion that his motive was to purposely and willfully violate the River Pointe covenants” — conduct rising to “willful misconduct that was morally reprehensible as to known facts.”
The court drew the contrast explicitly with Englund v. Dauphin Island Property Owners Association, decided four months earlier, where the same court found no such evidence and reversed an injunction against homeowners who had built past a setback.
Justice Parker's question
Justice Parker agreed with the outcome and wrote separately “to note a doctrinal question for future consideration”:
“Is the relative-hardship test truly an affirmative defense? Or is it instead merely an element of a plaintiff's required showing to obtain an injunction?”
His argument is structural. To obtain a permanent injunction in Alabama a plaintiff must show success on the merits, irreparable injury, compatibility with the public interest, and — “critically, here” — that the balance of the equities favours issuance. That fourth element is the relative hardships, and it already belongs to the plaintiff. Yet since 2023 the court's covenant decisions have called the same inquiry an affirmative defense belonging to the owner.
Justice Parker noted he “ha[s] been unable to find any Alabama cases decided before 2023 that describe the test as an affirmative defense,” and had also “struggled to find any cases outside Alabama describing the relative-hardship test as an affirmative defense.” The 2023 case is Cole v. Davis, 383 So. 3d 646, 654 (Ala. 2023).
Why it matters, in his words: the characterisation “will dictate who bears the burden of pleading and persuasion” and “could prove case-dispositive.” He closed by saying that “[i]n an appropriate future case” he would be open to argument that the test is not truly an affirmative defense.
Why the burden question is not academic
Three Alabama appellate decisions in ten months turned on this doctrine, and the placement of the burden explains all three outcomes.
In Englund (August 29, 2025) the homeowners raised hardship, the Supreme Court found the clean-hands bar unsupported, weighed the equities itself, and reversed and rendered judgment for the homeowners. In Dendy the owners raised it and lost it to their own conduct. In Austin Brook and Austin Park Property Owners Association v. Nabors (Ala. Civ. App., June 5, 2026) the owners never pleaded hardship at all, and the Court of Civil Appeals held flatly that “the defense of relative hardship is not available to support the trial court's judgment.”
If Justice Parker is right, the Nabors result is the one that changes. An element of the plaintiff's case does not disappear because the defendant failed to plead it; an affirmative defense does. Under the current framing, an owner who does not raise relative hardship in the pleadings has forfeited the only doctrine that could have saved the structure.
What it changes for boards and owners now
Until the court takes up the question, the rule stands as stated in Cole: “the relative-hardship defense is an affirmative one, and, thus, the burden is on the party asserting the defense.” Two operational consequences follow, and they point in opposite directions.
For an owner facing enforcement: plead it, and put on evidence. Nabors is a demonstration of what happens otherwise — the trial court there also barred the owner's hardship testimony, and because the owners did not seek appellate review of that ruling, the defense was gone twice over.
For an association: a proven breach is not a guaranteed injunction, and Englund is the proof. The facts that moved the balance there were the association's own: ambiguity about what the covenant was for, no specific evidence of diminished value to neighbours, an adjacent neighbour who acquiesced, and the association's own architectural committee having recommended approving the variance. An association that wants an injunction should be able to say concretely what benefit the covenant delivers and what is lost without it.
The clean-hands overlay adds a third point, and Dendy is a warning to owners: testimony that you intended to build something other than what you submitted is testimony that forfeits the defense. Knowledge of a covenant alone does not do that — Cole and Englund both treat notice as one factor rather than a bar — but demonstrated intent to evade does.
What to watch next
Justice Parker invited argument in “an appropriate future case.” That case would need a litigant who raises the characterisation directly; in Dendy “the parties d[id] not challenge” it, and he was not convinced the outcome would have turned on it either way. No Alabama decision since December 19, 2025 has taken up the invitation so far as we can find.
We have located no subsequent history for SC-2025-0024. The slip opinion carries the standard notice that it is “subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.”
Related Alabama HOA Topics
- Dendy v. Ryan, No. SC-2025-0024 (Ala. Dec. 19, 2025) (slip op., with Parker, J., concurring specially) ↩
- Englund v. Dauphin Island Prop. Owners Ass'n, Nos. SC-2024-0414, SC-2024-0437 (Ala. Aug. 29, 2025) (slip op.) ↩
- Austin Brook & Austin Park Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Nabors, No. CL-2025-0515 (Ala. Civ. App. June 5, 2026) (slip op.) ↩
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