A Georgia condo's “no security” clause does not bind renters, court holds
A Georgia condo's “no security” clause does not bind renters, court holds
2026-09-10 · Georgia · Courts
What happened. The Georgia Court of Appeals has decided, as a matter of first impression, that a condominium declaration's “no security” clause cannot be enforced against a renter — because a renter, unlike a unit owner, is not a member of the association.
Tuscany Condominium Association, Inc. v. C.P., an Adult Female, No. A25A0145, decided 2 July 2025. Watkins, J., with Brown, C.J., and Barnes, P.J., concurring. Published; affirmed on interlocutory appeal.1
The facts
On 7 June 2020, an assailant entered Tuscany Condominiums through an unlocked pedestrian gate, pulled C.P. into a vacant unit and raped her.
C.P. was a tenant, not a unit owner. She sued the association, the manager (Community Management Associates) and the security contractor (Dunwell Services).
Tuscany's declaration carries an all-capitals “no security” provision disclaiming any duty to provide security and any liability “by reason of failure to provide adequate security or ineffectiveness of safety measures undertaken.”
The settled rule, and the new question
Under Bradford Square Condominium Ass'n v. Miller, 258 Ga. App. 240 (2002), and Sadlowski v. Beacon Management Services, 348 Ga. App. 585 (2019), such clauses are enforceable against members.
The court framed what was new with precision:
“The question presented in this case, however, is not whether such a ‘no security’ provision can be applied to unit owners, but whether it can be applied to renters — who are, unlike unit owners, not members of the association. This is an issue of first impression.”
The holding
The court treated the clause as an exculpatory clause and applied Georgia's strict test: such clauses “must be clear and unambiguous, they must be specific in what they purport to cover,” because they amount to “a waiver of substantial rights” and “require[] a meeting of the minds on the subject matter.”
C.P.'s lease merely required her to abide by the association's covenants and rules generally, and disclaimed the landlord's security representations. That was not enough:
“the ‘no security’ provision is not enforceable as to C. P. because it was not explicit, prominent, clear, and unambiguous as to C. P.”
The court also rejected the argument that her rights derived from her landlord's: “C. P. is not relying on [the owner's] rights to seek relief from TCA. Instead, her claims are based on her own status as an invitee.”
Denials of summary judgment, of the motion to dismiss and of a compelled mental examination were all affirmed. The Community Associations Institute filed an amicus brief — a measure of how much the industry cares about the outcome.2
Why this reaches far beyond security clauses
The reasoning is not about security. It is about the contractual basis on which a Georgia declaration binds anybody — and it identifies a category of people living in condominiums whom the declaration reaches only weakly.
A unit owner is bound because they took title subject to a recorded declaration and are a member of the association. A tenant is bound, if at all, through a lease that incorporates the rules by reference. Tuscany holds that a general incorporation-by-reference is not the “meeting of the minds” that an exculpatory clause requires.
The same logic runs to any declaration provision that operates as a waiver of a substantial right rather than as a rule of conduct. The most obvious neighbours are:
- arbitration and covenant-not-to-sue clauses;
- limitation-of-liability and indemnity clauses;
- assumption-of-risk provisions for pools, gyms and playgrounds;
- notice-and-cure prerequisites to suit.
After Tuscany, an association relying on any of those against a resident who is not an owner needs a signed, specific acknowledgement rather than a lease clause pointing at the covenants.
The invitee point is the one that matters to boards
C.P.'s claim was not a contract claim. It was ordinary Georgia premises liability, owed to an invitee.
That is the structural problem the declaration cannot fix. A condominium association controls the common areas — the gates, the lighting, the locks — and everyone lawfully present in them is owed the duty an occupier owes an invitee. A clause in a document the invitee never signed does not alter that duty; at most it alters the contractual relationship between the association and its members.
The unlocked pedestrian gate is the fact that will decide the case on remand. A disclaimer that says the association undertakes no security obligation does not answer the allegation that it maintained a gate and failed to keep it locked.
What Georgia's new statute adds for tenants
Two things, and both point the same way as Tuscany — toward renters having a status of their own inside Georgia associations.
The complaint right. From 1 January 2027, § 43-17A-5 lets “[a]ny person residing in an owners' development” complain to the Secretary of State about the association's action or inaction, within 180 days. Not “any owner.” On the text, C.P. would have had standing to complain.3
Eviction-record sealing. Section 8 of the same Act adds O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50(e), letting a court make dispossessory records unavailable to the public in defined circumstances.
Neither is a security provision. But together with Tuscany they mark a genuine shift: Georgia law increasingly treats the condominium resident, rather than the condominium owner, as the relevant person.
What a Georgia association can do now
- Do not rely on the declaration against non-members. If a waiver matters, get it signed by the person it is meant to bind.
- Audit what you actually undertake. The greater exposure in a Georgia negligent-security case is usually not the absence of security but the presence of a measure that was not maintained. A gate that is supposed to lock is an undertaking.
- Check the insurance. From January, § 43-17A-7(2) gives owners the right on written demand to a certificate of insurance for coverage that “may apply to a potential claim.” A board that knows its liability tower has the answer before an owner asks.
- Be careful with all-capitals disclaimers. Prominence is one of the factors, but Tuscany shows it does not substitute for the clause reaching the right person.
What to watch next
The merits. This was an interlocutory appeal from denials of summary judgment and dismissal — nothing has been decided about whether Tuscany was negligent. What has been decided is that the declaration will not keep the question from a jury.
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