What was dismissed

Counts II, III and IV — the Vermont Fair Housing Act claim under 9 V.S.A. § 4503(a)(9), the public-accommodations claim under §§ 4502 and 4503, and the federal Fair Housing Act claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b) and 3617.

The reasoning was straightforward: “short-term renters are not a protected class”; the plaintiff did not allege she is disabled or a member of any protected class; she suffered no injury in fact and cannot sue on others' behalf. The court also found “no authority for the proposition that the Vermont statutes or the ADA provide protections for individuals with emotional support animals” — and noted the rule expressly exempts service animals under the ADA. It applied Francis v. Kings Park Manor, 992 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021) at the pleading stage.

What survives, and why it is the real question

The association moved only on Counts II through IV. Count I was not dismissed. It argues that a pet restriction of this kind required a recorded declaration amendment rather than a board-adopted rule.

That is the issue with the widest reach, because it decides whether a board can do by rule what the declaration does not authorise.

What 27A V.S.A. § 3-120 actually permits

Section 3-120 gives a Vermont executive board rule-making power and then constrains it:

• Advance notice of the text of a proposed rule, plus the date on which the board will act “after considering comments from unit owners”;
• Notice and a copy of the rule after adoption;
• “Every rule must be reasonable.”
• Rules affecting use of, or behaviour in, residential units are limited to the three grounds in § 3-120(f).

A declaration that permits pets, and a rule that forbids them in a defined circumstance, are not obviously reconcilable under a statute that subordinates rules to the declaration. That tension is Count I.

And the fine has its own conditions

27A V.S.A. § 3-102(a)(11) permits an association to impose charges for late payment of assessments and, “after notice and a hearing”, to impose “reasonable fines for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules of the association.”

Notice and a hearing are conditions precedent, not formalities. “Reasonable” is the only ceiling — Vermont sets no dollar cap and no per-day cap — but a rule that generates $100 a day against an owner for a guest's dog is a rule whose reasonableness a court can be asked about.

Section 3-102(a)(18) also limits what a board may do to a non-paying owner: it may suspend rights and privileges, but may not deny access to the unit, suspend the right to vote, prevent an owner from seeking election, or withhold services where that would endanger health, safety or property.

The applicability trap in both provisions

Section 3-120 is on neither § 1-204 retroactive list. Section 3-102(a)(18) is outside the retroactive portion of § 3-102 as well, which reaches only subdivisions (a)(1) through (6) and (11) through (16).

So in a Vermont community created before January 1, 1999: the rule-making procedure does not apply, the limits on suspending owner rights do not apply — but the fining power at § 3-102(a)(11), with its notice-and-hearing condition, does.

What to watch next

Count I. A Vermont decision on whether a board can restrict pets by rule where the declaration permits them would be the first of its kind in the state.