DC's top court revives a condo EV-charger claim and rewrites fee-shifting
DC's top court revives a condo EV-charger claim and rewrites fee-shifting
2026-09-09 · District of Columbia · Courts
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that a condominium association cannot extinguish a unit owner's claim for an injunction by adopting, mid-litigation, a rule that permits the thing the owner asked for on the association's own terms. In the same opinion, the court construed the Condominium Act's fee-shifting standard for the first time — and made it harder for owners and easier for associations in one respect, while rejecting the arithmetic that had been used to cut fee awards.1
Burton as Trustee of the EB Trust v. Chase Point Unit Owners Association, Nos. 24-CV-1122 & 24-CV-1168, was argued March 25, 2026 and decided August 20, 2026. Judge Deahl wrote for a panel of Judges McLeese, Deahl and Howard. The Washington Metropolitan Chapter of the Community Associations Institute filed an amicus brief supporting the association.
What happened below
Trustees of a family trust owning a unit at the Chase Point condominium asked the board for permission to install a charging station for a Tesla, according to plans they presented in 2019. The association refused. The owners sued, raising seven claims and seeking, on all but one, declaratory or injunctive relief barring the association from blocking the installation.
A jury found for the owners on one claim — violation of the governing documents under D.C. Code § 42-1902.09(a) — and awarded $4,000. The association subsequently adopted “Rule S,” permitting charging stations on stated conditions, including a requirement to employ a contractor approved by the association. The trial court held the equitable claims moot and cut the fee award.
The mootness holding
The Court of Appeals disagreed. The owners had asked for a declaration that they could install “according to the plan they presented” in 2019. As the court put it: “The mere existence of Rule S, which indisputably does not give the Burtons any right to install a charging station according to their own plans, or through their own preferred vendor, thus does not moot out their requests for equitable relief.”
A remedial rule adopted on the association's terms is not the relief the owner sought, and it does not end the case.
The fee-shifting holding, in both directions
D.C. Code § 42-1902.09(b) shifts fees to “the substantially prevailing party” in suits over the governing documents. The trial court had read that as the ordinary “prevailing party” standard and then awarded a fraction of fees proportional to the share of claims won.
The Court of Appeals rejected both moves.
The standard is more exacting than “prevailing party.” The court agreed with the association that “substantially prevailing party” “is more exacting than the ‘prevailing party’ standard the trial court equated it to and requires a plaintiff to obtain more than a mere modicum of relief.” A token damages award is not enough.
But claim-counting is out. “We also agree with the Burtons that it is not a sensible approach to award the substantially prevailing party a fraction of attorneys' fees in proportion to the raw percentage of claims they won. Where a plaintiff brings multiple claims seeking the same targeted relief, they could generally be said to have substantially prevailed if they obtain that primary relief, no matter how many claims they prevailed on.”
The court expressly declined to decide who, if anyone, substantially prevailed here — that may turn on whether the owners ultimately obtain the declaratory and injunctive relief that was “at the core of this dispute.” It vacated and remanded.
What it changes for DC associations
Adopting a rule to end a lawsuit does not end the lawsuit. Boards facing litigation over a refused request — a charger, a modification, an accommodation — sometimes respond by passing a general rule permitting the category. That may be good governance. It is not a mootness defence where the owner asked for something specific the rule does not deliver.
The fee calculus is now a relief question, not a scorecard. The operative question on remand is whether a party obtained the primary relief sought. For an association, that reframes settlement analysis: conceding the specific relief early may be cheaper than winning six of seven claims and losing the one that carries the injunction.
Pleading strategy shifts too. An owner who pleads seven theories aimed at one outcome is no longer penalised for the six that fail. That cuts against the “bury them in claims and win on fees” concern, but it also removes an association's arithmetic defence.
The statutory backdrop worth knowing
This was litigated under the governing documents and the Condominium Act, not under DC's right-to-charge statute — because that statute has never taken effect. Until it does, DC charger disputes are declaration-and-bylaws disputes, and this opinion is the map of how their fees get decided.
The court left open whether a “catalyst theory” — prevailing because the suit prompted the change — can satisfy the standard. That question will decide a lot of DC association fee fights.
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