Why it was vacated, and what that leaves behind

The Court vacated rather than reversed, which matters. Its reasoning was that no one was actually trying to enforce the new laws against covenanted property:

“There was no party before the District Court arguing for the application of or seeking to enforce the new laws against any property of MAID's members subject to restrictive covenants … that covenant is not in the record, and the enforceability of that restrictive covenant was not at issue … its broad declaratory judgment, untethered to a specific claim or set of facts, was an advisory opinion.”

So the covenant question was not decided against associations. It was removed from the books as never properly presented. The practical position today:

• There is no binding Montana holding that SB 323, SB 528 or SB 382 displace a more restrictive private covenant.
• There is no binding Montana holding that they cannot.
• The question is unresolved — genuinely open, not settled quietly either way.

What an association argues from instead

The stronger ground was always the statutes' own text, and it survives untouched. § 76-2-345(2) bars a municipality from requiring restrictive covenants as a condition of permitting an ADU, while expressly not preventing private parties from entering such covenants. Montana's 2025 county ADU statute, § 76-2-215(2)(h) (SB 532, Chapter 619), carries the same structure in sharper words:³²

“This subsection (2)(h) may not be construed to prohibit restrictive covenants concerning accessory dwelling units entered into between private parties, but the county may not condition a permit, license, or use of an accessory dwelling unit on the adoption or implementation of a restrictive covenant entered into between private parties.”

These statutes say what municipalities and counties must permit. Whether a recorded covenant independently restricts an owner is a separate contract question. That is the distinction cities themselves draw — Missoula's own guidance tells residents that zoning sets the citywide rules while covenants add private requirements, and that “[o]nly homeowners can change those private agreements, not the City.”

The equal-protection holding is useful to associations, oddly enough

MAID argued covenanted owners were treated differently from non-covenanted owners. The Court rejected it at the threshold, and its reasoning is worth quoting because it characterises covenants in a way that helps enforcement:

“The rights created by restrictive covenants are contract rights” … “A restrictive covenant creates a classification that cannot, in its essence, be similarly situated to any classification outside of that restrictive covenant” … “homeowners without such covenants are not treated differently because of the statute.”

Covenants as mutual-benefit-and-burden contract rights is the framing Montana associations want. It also means future equal-protection attacks on Montana land-use statutes premised on “covenanted owners get a benefit we don't” face a controlling bar at the similarly-situated step.

Where the statutes stand today

• § 76-2-345 (ADUs): in force, never amended, no sunset.
• § 76-2-304 (duplex mandate): in force; amended in 2025 by Chapters 591 and 682, with a further version effective October 1, 2026. No sunset.
• Land Use Planning Act participation provisions: the permanent injunction is reversed, so those sections are not enjoined. Senate Bill 121's 2025 replacement provisions govern now — and they sunset June 30, 2027 absent legislative action, which is why the Court held the challenge was not moot.

No statute in the 2023 housing package is currently enjoined or invalidated.

Two related decisions that do bind, and one drafting oddity

While the statutory-displacement question sits open, Montana does have binding authority on covenants and accessory dwelling units between private parties. Myers v. Kleinhans, 2024 MT 208, held that converting a garage into an ADU created “two separate single-family dwellings” in breach of a one-dwelling-per-lot covenant, and that renting it for profit was unambiguously a commercial business. A municipality's duty to allow an ADU by right does not, on the face of these authorities, speak to that claim.

One detail for anyone reading the opinion closely: the Court's quotation of the district court's order lists “SB 323, SB 528, SB 425, and SB 382.” SB 425 is not among the bills the Court itemises; the fourth bill in the case was SB 245, whose constitutionality the Court expressly declined to reach because the argument was never developed. We quote the opinion as printed and flag the discrepancy rather than silently correcting it.