Massachusetts HOA Fining Authority

Section 1: Overview — Fining authority in Massachusetts

Massachusetts regulates common-interest communities through one statute: the Massachusetts Condominium Act, M.G.L. c. 183A. The Commonwealth has no comprehensive homeowners association or planned-community statute.¹ For condominiums, the fining authority is express, but it's sparse. Section 10(b)(5) of c. 183A empowers the organization of unit owners to "levy reasonable fines for violations of the master deed, trust, by-laws, restrictions, rules or regulations."² The statute grants the power, not the procedure. So the operative rules for imposing a fine come from the master deed and bylaws, backed by a common-law reasonableness standard. Massachusetts associations frequently organize as a condominium trust, with trustees performing the board function; c. 183A expressly allows the organization to take the form of a corporation, trust, or unincorporated association.³ The central operative limit sits in the § 6 lien and its super-priority over a first mortgage — a priority that reaches common expense assessments and certain costs, not fines.⁴ That distinction drives the key downstream question this page answers: can an unpaid fine become a lien and support foreclosure? The Quick-Reference table and Section 3C answer it. Planned communities that aren't condominiums carry no statutory fining authority at all; they can fine, lien, and foreclose only if the recorded covenants create that power.⁵ This page focuses on fining mechanics rather than re-litigating which statute governs. The Quick-Reference table below summarizes those mechanics.

Section 2: Quick-Reference Fining Mechanics Table

The table below lays out Massachusetts fining mechanics at a glance. The Condominiums column reflects the Massachusetts Condominium Act (c. 183A), where the fining power is statutory but the procedure and amount come largely from the master deed and bylaws. The Planned Communities column reflects the governing-document-derived framework that applies to non-condominium associations — no statute supplies fining, lien, or foreclosure authority for those communities. Section 3 sources every value in detail.

The Condominiums column reflects the Massachusetts Condominium Act (c. 183A); its super-priority lien under c. 183A, § 6 covers common expense assessments, not fines. The Planned Communities column is governing-document-derived. Last verified: July 14, 2026.

Section 3: Fining mechanics in detail

3A. Source and outer limits of fining authority

For condominiums, the fining power is express, and it comes straight from the statute. M.G.L. c. 183A, § 10(b)(5) gives the corporation, trust, or association of unit owners the power "[t]o impose charges or to charge interest for the late payment of common expense assessments or other charges, and to levy reasonable fines for violations of the master deed, trust, by-laws, restrictions, rules or regulations of the organization of unit owners."² That corrects a common assumption — that condominium fining in Massachusetts flows purely from governing documents. The power itself comes from the statute, though its exercise still depends on authority and procedure spelled out in the master deed and bylaws. The organization of unit owners holds this power. Under c. 183A, § 1, the "organization of unit owners" means "the corporation, trust or association owned by the unit owners and used by them to manage and regulate the condominium," and in Massachusetts practice, that entity is very often a condominium trust, with trustees carrying out the fining function.³

The statute imposes one substantive limit on its face: fines must be "reasonable." It sets no statutory dollar cap and no statutory fine schedule.² Massachusetts appellate courts have supplied the reasonableness overlay. In Noble v. Murphy, the Appeals Court held that courts review condominium use restrictions and their enforcement for "equitable reasonableness," explaining that "[i]f a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; if not, it cannot."⁶ In Board of Managers of Old Colony Village Condominium v. Preu, the Appeals Court added that courts can still invalidate a facially reasonable rule if it violates a fundamental public policy or a constitutional provision.⁹ Case law supplies a separate doctrinal limit, too: a board acting alone through administrative rules can regulate only the common areas, not conduct inside a unit. Restrictions on unit use must appear in the master deed or bylaws to be enforceable.⁶

For planned communities that aren't condominiums, no statutory fining authority exists at all. Massachusetts hasn't enacted a general HOA or planned-community act, and the Commonwealth isn't a UCIOA or Uniform Condominium Act state.¹ A non-condominium association's power to fine comes entirely from its recorded declaration and covenants. M.G.L. c. 180, the nonprofit corporation statute, supplies corporate formalities — formation, meetings, directors — where the association incorporates, but it confers no fining or lien power.⁵ Compared with modern uniform acts, c. 183A stays sparse on enforcement: it grants the power to fine and makes fines collectible, but it doesn't prescribe the notice-and-hearing template that UCIOA jurisdictions codify.

3B. The required fining procedure

Chapter 183A sets no procedural predicate for imposing a fine. It fixes no minimum notice period, no cure period, no hearing-request deadline, and no requirement of a written decision.² The 60-day delinquency notice and 30-day notice of intent to sue that appear in § 6(c) condition enforcement of the common-expense lien against a delinquent owner and the first mortgagee — they don't set a general fining procedure.⁴ So the enforceable procedure for a condominium fine is whatever the master deed and bylaws require, layered over the common-law expectation of reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond. In Noble v. Murphy, the Appeals Court emphasized that the unit owners "received ample and repeated notice of violation and reasonable opportunity" to cure before enforcement — a signal that notice and an opportunity to be heard function as practical prerequisites to a defensible fine, even without a statutory command.⁶ The trustees or managing board carry out this function; where the organization takes the form of a trust, the trustees act for it.³ The governing documents decide whether per-day or continuing fines are permitted, subject to the same reasonableness limit. For planned communities, the procedure comes entirely from the governing documents plus common law, with no statutory floor. The practical implication holds across both tracks: a Massachusetts fine's enforceability turns on the master deed and bylaws (or covenants), and on whether the owner received reasonable notice and a genuine opportunity to be heard. Owners face a further procedural reality: the "pay under protest" rule. In Blood v. Edgar's, Inc., the Appeals Court held that a unit owner can't challenge a charge by withholding payment — the owner must pay and sue separately, a rule practitioners apply to fines as well as assessments.¹⁰

3C. Enforcement of unpaid fines: assessments, the super-lien, and foreclosure

This is the subsection where people most easily misstate Massachusetts law. Keep three points distinct. First, fines are lienable. Section 6(a)(ii) provides that the organization "may also assess any fees, attorneys' fees, charges, late charges, fines, costs of collection and enforcement, court costs, and interest charged pursuant to this chapter against the unit owner and such assessment shall constitute a lien against the unit from the time the assessment is due, and shall be enforceable as common expense assessments under this chapter."⁴ Section 6(b) makes the unit owner personally liable for "fines, penalties, and interest" as well.⁴ Because a fine balance is enforceable as a common expense assessment, it can support the association's lien and, through that lien, a foreclosure action. Associations enforce the lien under M.G.L. c. 254, §§ 5 and 5A, which direct that a c. 183A, § 6 lien be enforced by civil action in the Superior Court or the District Court, with the court entering an order authorizing sale of the unit to satisfy the lien.⁷

Second — and this is the decisive point — the super-priority doesn't reach fines. The § 6(c) priority over a first mortgage covers only common expense assessments "which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the six months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien," plus costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in that action.⁴ The statute then states expressly: "The priority amount shall not include any amounts attributable to special assessments, late charges, fines, penalties, and interest assessed by the organization of unit owners."⁴ So a fine balance is a lien, and it can be foreclosed, but it sits behind a first mortgage rather than ahead of it. In Drummer Boy Homes Association v. Britton, the Supreme Judicial Court construed § 6 to let an association file successive actions establishing multiple contemporaneous six-month priority liens for unpaid common expenses — the "rolling lien" practice — but that priority mechanic applies to common expense assessments, not fines.¹¹ The Land Court hears many condominium title and real-property disputes, but the lien-enforcement statute itself, c. 254, § 5, names the Superior Court and the District Court, and practitioners treat the District, Housing, and Superior Courts as holding concurrent jurisdiction over § 6 lien actions.⁷

Third, planned communities carry no statutory lien. A non-condominium association can lien and foreclose only if its recorded declaration creates those rights; no c. 183A analog and no statutory super-priority exist for it.⁵ As for suspension of rights, c. 183A doesn't authorize suspension of voting or amenity use, so any such remedy has to come from the governing documents. It's constrained, too: a unit owner's interest in the common areas counts as a property right appurtenant to the unit and can't be separated from unit ownership under § 10(a), and § 4 confers exclusive ownership and possession of the unit — which limits an association's ability to bar a unit owner from common areas the owner co-owns.⁸

Section 4: Recent legislative and judicial activity

A. Recent bills

Two bills in the current General Court bear on condominium fining, due process, or the broader statutory framework. Neither has become law. For context: St. 2024, c. 239 (the Affordable Homes Act) most recently amended c. 183A, §§ 6 and 10, effective February 18, 2025 — though those amendments addressed energy and electric-vehicle provisions, not the fining power itself.¹²

B. Recent appellate rulings

No published decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court or the Supreme Judicial Court in the past 36 months has squarely addressed condominium fine enforceability, the c. 183A lien as applied to fines, fine-specific due process, or fine foreclosure. The controlling authorities remain older: Drummer Boy Homes Association v. Britton (SJC, 2016) on the § 6 lien and its super-priority, and Noble v. Murphy (1993) and Blood v. Edgar's, Inc. (1994) on reasonableness and pay-under-protest. The case below is the most recent published condominium decision in the window, noted here for completeness, though it concerns disability-modification cost allocation, not fining.

C. Active legislative debates

The active debate runs structural rather than fine-specific. The CORA bill (S.980/H.4826) would add owner records, reserve, and ombudsman rights, and the H.1538 study commission and H.5516 ("An Act relative to condominium associations and management companies," referred to the Joint Committee on Consumer Protection and Professional Licensure, with a Senate concurrence action recorded June 18, 2026) would examine board conduct, manager licensing, and enforcement, including board education on levying fines.¹³ No pending bill amends the § 6 super-priority or creates a comprehensive HOA statute.

Section 5: National positioning and related coverage

Massachusetts occupies a distinct middle position on fining authority. It's a condominium-statute-only state: it has one common-interest statute, c. 183A, that grants an express but sparsely detailed fining power and pairs it with a strong common-expense super-lien. But it lacks the codified notice-and-hearing fining template that the nine UCIOA states have built in — the 1982-version states Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, and West Virginia, and the 2008-version states Connecticut, Delaware, Vermont, and Washington — and it has nothing resembling a comprehensive single-statute regime like California's. So Massachusetts operators can't rely on a statutory fining default; they have to read the master deed and bylaws to find the procedure, cure period, and fine schedule, because the statute supplies only the power and a reasonableness limit. Planned communities sit even further out on the spectrum, with no governing statute at all and every enforcement right dependent on recorded covenants. The defining Massachusetts feature is the § 6 super-priority lien, which gives associations real leverage over first mortgagees — but that leverage stops at common expense assessments and doesn't extend to fines.

HOA Weekly updates this Massachusetts Fining Authority coverage quarterly as the General Court and the Massachusetts appellate courts act. Federal frameworks apply to Massachusetts associations too, regardless of the state framework — the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act can reach third-party collection of fines, and the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and the FCC's OTARD rule all apply as well; those are covered at /federal/ once that section is built.

Recommendations

• Before issuing any fine, confirm the master deed or bylaws authorize it, and follow whatever notice and hearing steps those documents require. Because c. 183A imposes none of its own, the governing documents plus reasonable notice and a genuine opportunity to respond are the enforceability test.
• Keep fine balances separate from common expense assessments in your books. Fines are lienable and can support foreclosure, but the six-month super-priority excludes them, so treating them as priority amounts risks an unenforceable claim against a first mortgagee.
• To preserve super-priority leverage, pursue delinquent common expense assessments promptly under c. 254, §§ 5 and 5A and the § 6(c) notice sequence; the priority is limited, and the rolling-lien practice requires timely successive actions.
• For planned communities, audit the recorded covenants first. If they don't expressly create a fine, lien, and foreclosure right, those remedies don't exist, and enforcement has to proceed as an ordinary contract or covenant action.
• Watch for benchmarks that would change this guidance: enactment of the CORA bill (adding records, reserve, and ombudsman mechanics), enactment of any bill amending § 6 or § 10, or a new Appeals Court or SJC decision addressing fine reasonableness, fine due process, or fines within the lien.

Caveats

• A seeded premise that c. 183A grants no express fining power is incorrect; § 10(b)(5) grants it expressly. This page states the verified statutory position.
• Fines are lienable under § 6(a)(ii), but the § 6(c) super-priority excludes them. Conflating the two is the highest-risk error in this area.
• No statutory notice period, hearing deadline, or dollar cap exists for condominium fines. Any such figure comes from the governing documents, not the statute.
• Geezil v. White Cliffs appears here as the most recent published condominium decision in the window, but it isn't a fining case; the controlling fining and lien authorities predate the 36-month window.
• Massachusetts hasn't adopted UCIOA or the Uniform Condominium Act. Courts have observed that the six-month super-lien concept drew on the Uniform Condominium Act, but the operative rules here trace to c. 183A itself.

1. M.G.L. c. 183A (Condominiums), Massachusetts General Laws ↩
2. M.G.L. c. 183A, § 10(b)(5), Massachusetts General Laws ↩
3. M.G.L. c. 183A, § 1 (definition of "organization of unit owners"); § 10(a) ↩
4. M.G.L. c. 183A, § 6(a)(ii), (b), (c), Massachusetts General Laws ↩
5. Mass.gov, Condominiums ("The Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not have any jurisdiction or regulatory oversight over Condominiums"); M.G.L. c. 180 (nonprofit corporations) ↩
6. Noble v. Murphy, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 452 (1993) ↩
7. M.G.L. c. 254, §§ 5 and 5A, Massachusetts General Laws ↩
8. M.G.L. c. 183A, § 10(a) and § 4 (common-area interest appurtenant to unit) ↩
9. Board of Managers of Old Colony Village Condominium v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728 (2011) ↩
10. Blood v. Edgar's, Inc., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 402 (1994) ↩
11. Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. v. Britton, 474 Mass. 17 (2016) ↩
12. Mass. General Laws c. 183A (amendment history, St. 2024, c. 239, eff. Feb. 18, 2025), Mass.gov ↩
13. Bill H.1538, 194th General Court, Massachusetts Legislature ↩
14. Bill S.980, 194th General Court, Massachusetts Legislature ↩
15. Geezil v. White Cliffs Condominium Four Association, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 103, No. 23-P-1103 (Nov. 13, 2024) ↩