South Carolina's leading new covenant case: 'residential purposes' aims at commercial use, not at empty lots
South Carolina's leading new covenant case: 'residential purposes' aims at commercial use, not at empty lots
2026-09-19 · South Carolina · Courts
A bare "residential purposes" restriction in South Carolina is aimed at commercial use. It does not require that anyone live on the lot. That is the holding of published Opinion No. 6138, filed February 18, 2026 and, after a rehearing petition, withdrawn, substituted and refiled on March 25, 2026 — the operative version.1
The facts
Lots in Providence Point on Lake Hartwell carry the restriction "No lot shall be used for other than residential purposes." An owner bought three shallow lots on which building is effectively impossible, obtained Corps of Engineers dock permits, ran power and water to the docks, and used the lots only to park and to walk across to reach them.
Neighbours sought an injunction, arguing the use was recreational rather than residential. Pressed on the boundary of their own position, they told the court the owner could not even picnic or camp on his own lot.
The holding
The Court of Appeals agreed the covenant is unambiguous, and held that on these facts the owner did not violate it. It affirmed, with Chief Judge Williams and Judge Curtis concurring.
The framework it restated is the one that decides most South Carolina covenant disputes:
- Restrictive covenants are contractual and construed from the whole document.
- Words take their ordinary meaning as at the time of execution.
- Where language is equally capable of two or more constructions, the court adopts the one that least restricts the property.
- The party seeking enforcement bears the burden.
Why the existing South Carolina cases did not answer it
Every prior South Carolina "residential purposes" decision the court surveyed was a residential-versus-commercial case: a beauty shop in Cothran v. Stroman, an equestrian centre in Kinard v. Richardson, car-dealership parking in Buffington. None addressed whether a residential-purposes covenant requires habitation at all.
The court therefore reasoned from out-of-state authority. It drew on Voedisch v. Town of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1992), holding that a vacant lot used solely for dock access does not violate a residential-purposes covenant because such covenants "merely limit the use of the property to living purposes as distinguished from business or commercial purposes." And it drew particularly on Villazon v. Osborne, 922 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025), holding no reading of "residential purposes" requires habitation, and that a "parade of horribles" of imagined recreational uses ignores that each case turns on its own facts.
The public-policy question raised by the neighbours was not reached.
What this settles, and what it does not
Settled at category level: in South Carolina a bare residential-purposes restriction is directed at commercial use; it does not compel habitation; and it will not be stretched to bar quiet, non-commercial activity such as crossing one's own lot to reach a dock.
Not settled: this is a fact-specific affirmance, not a safe harbour. The court's own reasoning — that each case turns on its facts — cuts against reading it as licence for any non-residential use. An activity with commercial character on a residential-purposes lot remains squarely within the covenant's target, and short-term rental disputes in particular continue to be decided on the specific rental language in the instrument rather than on the residential-purposes clause.
Where it fits with the rest of South Carolina covenant law
The least-restrictive canon that decided Hoffman is the same rule that decides South Carolina covenant cases across subject matter. Two unpublished decisions from the same window show its reach in both directions.
In Barwick v. Edisto Lake, Inc., 2026-UP-382, filed July 22, 2026, residents of a gated lake community could not stop hunting on 219 private acres: their neighbourhood's covenants were silent on hunting, restrictions are strictly construed with doubts resolved in favour of free use, and a court "may not enlarge or extend a restriction beyond its clear meaning." A general covenant against "noxious or offensive activity" would not serve as a catch-all.2
In Cruz v. Bouknight, 2026-UP-024, filed January 28, 2026, the canon cut the other way. Covenants recorded in 1954 prohibited a "trailer." The court held the word included what is now called a manufactured home, because words take their ordinary meaning at the time of execution, and ordered removal.3
Both are unpublished and carry no precedential value under Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR. Together with Hoffman they describe a consistent method: read the words as they were understood when written, do not extend them, and put the burden on whoever wants the restriction enforced.
For the background framework, see South Carolina's governing statutes and how rental restrictions are construed.
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