Texas Supreme Court leaves Swan Point Landing standing: rental bans yes, uneven assessments no
Texas Supreme Court leaves Swan Point Landing standing: rental bans yes, uneven assessments no
2026-09-19 · Texas · Courts
What happened. The Supreme Court of Texas denied the petitions for review in cause No. 25-0575 on 12 June 2026. The case is Christopher T. Martin, Chris and Deb Martin Rental, LLC, 336 Bayside Drive, LLC, 387 Bayside Drive, LLC, and 553 Bayside Drive, LLC v. Swan Point Landing Community Association, Inc. and Swan Point Landing, LLC, from Calhoun County, on appeal from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals.1
The Court's orders list records the underlying decision as 13-24-00051-CV, 718 S.W.3d 310, decided 29 May 2025, and notes that two petitions were denied. A published court of appeals opinion left undisturbed by a denial of review is the most authoritative statement Texas has on the questions it decided, short of a merits opinion from the Supreme Court itself.
What the appeal was about
The dispute concerned amendments to a subdivision's declarations and the association's attempt to allocate the cost of road repairs. According to a case analysis published by the Texas community-association firm Roberts Markel Weinberg Butler Hailey, the amendments restricted short-term rentals, extended the declarant's development period and weighted voting, and the association levied a special assessment for road repair allocated by a traffic study attributing 79 per cent of the wear to the objecting owners' commercial rental operation.2
The amendment question, and the test the court applied
The firm's analysis reports that the court of appeals applied the three-part framework from Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civic League: the governing documents must authorise amendment; the amendment must constitute a correction or improvement rather than a destruction of the agreement; and the amendment must be legal and not contrary to public policy.2
On the first element the analysis quotes the court's observation that “the amendment clause in the 2006 Declarations clearly set out how the terms and provision of the restrictions could be amended.” On the second, it places the decision in a line of Texas authority — Cauthron, Chu and Angelwylde — holding that a general amendment clause is sufficient to support a later restriction on short-term rentals, without the original declaration having anticipated the subject.
The reported outcome on this issue is that the amendments survived, including the extension of the declarant's development period and its weighted voting.
The assessment question, and where the association lost
The same analysis reports that the court rejected the use-based allocation. Because the declaration provided that the assessment burden fell equally on all owners, a special assessment could not be reallocated so that one owner bore a disproportionate share derived from a traffic study, however well evidenced the underlying usage.2
Stated at the category level, the two halves of the decision point in opposite directions and both are useful. The power to amend a declaration under a general amendment clause is broad enough in Texas to reach a use restriction the original owners never voted on. The power to assess is narrower, because it is bounded by what the declaration itself says about how the burden is shared. An amendment validly adopted does not thereby acquire the power to change who pays.
What a denial of review does and does not mean
A Texas denial of a petition for review is not an endorsement of the court of appeals' reasoning, and the Supreme Court's orders carry no opinion. What it does is end the case and leave a published, citable appellate decision in force in the Thirteenth District and available as persuasive authority elsewhere in the state. A published opinion reported at 718 S.W.3d 310 will be cited; the denial removes the prospect of it being displaced.
The companion decision from the same period
The same SCOTX orders list of 12 June 2026 denied review in cause No. 25-0764, Nick Mehmeti v. The Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association, Inc., from Dallas County, on appeal from the Fifth Court of Appeals (05-23-01260-CV, decided 9 June 2025).1 Two Texas association appeals reached the Court on the same day and neither was taken.
The municipal decision running alongside it
Six days later, on 18 June 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, holding that Texas law does not recognise a protected property interest in “the right to lease one's home on a short-term basis” and upholding a municipal short-term rental ordinance against due-process and equal-protection challenge.3 The two cases arrive at the same destination by different routes — one through covenant law, one through zoning.
What to watch next
The questions the decision leaves open are the ones its facts did not present: what happens where a declaration is silent on how assessments are shared rather than expressly equal, and where the line falls between an amendment that corrects or improves and one that destroys the original agreement. Both are fact-bound, and neither was resolved by the denial of review.
Related Texas HOA Topics
- Supreme Court of Texas, Orders Pronounced June 12, 2026 — petitions for review denied, No. 25-0575 and No. 25-0764 ↩
- Leslie Hyman, 'Case Law Update: Courts Reaffirm the Right of POAs and Municipalities to Restrict Short-Term Rentals', Roberts Markel Weinberg Butler Hailey, 2 July 2026 ↩
- Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, No. 25-50025 (5th Cir. June 18, 2026) — slip opinion ↩
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